# Togoder Security

> Togoder Security reads the source of every package in your lockfile with AI to catch malware, install-time payloads, credential theft and backdoors. npm, PyPI, crates.io, Go, RubyGems, Packagist. Every completed scan is published as a free public security report.

Togoder Security downloads open-source packages from the official registries (never executing them) and has an AI model read each source file, looking for install-time payloads, credential theft, data exfiltration, obfuscated loaders, backdoors, wallet drainers and crypto miners. Verdicts are cached per file by SHA-256, so identical code is reviewed once. 1,917 package versions have been reviewed so far; 384 have findings at medium severity or above.

## Package security reports

Report URLs are predictable. Append `.md` to any report URL for a plain Markdown version.

- npm: https://security.togoder.click/npm/{name} (latest scan) and https://security.togoder.click/npm/{name}@{version}, e.g. https://security.togoder.click/npm/express
- Scoped npm packages: https://security.togoder.click/npm/@{scope}/{name}
- PyPI: https://security.togoder.click/pypi/{name} · crates.io: https://security.togoder.click/cargo/{name} · Go: https://security.togoder.click/go/{module} · RubyGems: https://security.togoder.click/gem/{name} · Packagist: https://security.togoder.click/composer/{vendor}/{name}
- [Malicious and suspicious packages tracker](https://security.togoder.click/malicious-packages): newest flagged versions by severity
- [All scanned npm packages](https://security.togoder.click/npm)
- [Sitemap index](https://security.togoder.click/sitemap.xml)

## Guides

- [How to check if an npm package is malicious](https://security.togoder.click/guides/check-npm-package-for-malware): How to check if an npm package is malicious: a hands-on checklist for install scripts, tarball contents, obfuscation, maintainers and typosquats.
- [npm supply chain attacks: types, incidents, defenses](https://security.togoder.click/guides/npm-supply-chain-attacks): npm supply chain attacks explained: typosquatting, dependency confusion, account takeover, protestware and worms, from event-stream to Shai-Hulud.
- [npm install scripts security: postinstall risks & fixes](https://security.togoder.click/guides/npm-install-scripts-security): npm install scripts security: why postinstall hooks are a top malware vector, how to audit them, and how npm, pnpm, Yarn, Bun, pip and cargo differ.
- [npm audit vs source code scanning: what each catches](https://security.togoder.click/guides/npm-audit-vs-source-code-scanning): npm audit vs source code scanning: how advisory databases like npm audit, Dependabot and OSV compare with behavioral analysis of code, and why you need both.
- [Scan your lockfile in CI: dependency malware checks](https://security.togoder.click/guides/scan-lockfile-in-ci): How to scan a lockfile in CI for malicious dependencies: GitHub Actions example, npm ci, lockfile-lint, ignore-scripts, pinning and scanning only changes.
- [Methodology](https://security.togoder.click/methodology): how scanning works, severity levels and limits

## Glossary

- [Dependency confusion](https://security.togoder.click/glossary/dependency-confusion): Dependency confusion (also called a substitution attack) is publishing a package to a public registry under the same name as a company's internal package, so that a misconfigured package manager installs the public, attacker-controlled version instead.
- [Install scripts (postinstall)](https://security.togoder.click/glossary/install-scripts): Install scripts are commands a package declares in package.json (preinstall, install, postinstall) that npm runs automatically during installation, with the installing user's permissions, for every package in the dependency tree.
- [Lockfile](https://security.togoder.click/glossary/lockfile): A lockfile (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lock, poetry.lock, Cargo.lock and others) records the exact resolved version, download URL and integrity hash of every direct and transitive dependency, so installs are reproducible.
- [Maintainer account takeover](https://security.togoder.click/glossary/maintainer-account-takeover): A maintainer account takeover is when an attacker gains control of a package maintainer's registry account or publish token, through phishing, password reuse or a leaked token, and uses it to publish a malicious version of a trusted package.
- [Protestware](https://security.togoder.click/glossary/protestware): Protestware is open-source software that its own maintainer deliberately changes to make a protest or political statement, ranging from printing a message to breaking the package or damaging files on certain machines.
- [SBOM (software bill of materials)](https://security.togoder.click/glossary/sbom): An SBOM (software bill of materials) is a machine-readable inventory of the components in a piece of software, including each open-source package, its version, supplier and license, usually in the SPDX or CycloneDX format.
- [Slopsquatting](https://security.togoder.click/glossary/slopsquatting): Slopsquatting is registering package names that AI models hallucinate, so that when a coding assistant (or a developer copying its answer) runs the install command, the attacker's package is what gets installed.
- [Software composition analysis (SCA)](https://security.togoder.click/glossary/software-composition-analysis): Software composition analysis (SCA) identifies the open-source components an application uses, usually from lockfiles or manifests, and matches them against databases of known vulnerabilities (CVEs and advisories) and license terms.
- [Software supply chain attack](https://security.togoder.click/glossary/supply-chain-attack): A software supply chain attack compromises something a target trusts and installs, such as an open-source dependency, a build tool, a CI action or a vendor update, so that malicious code reaches every downstream user without attacking them directly.
- [Typosquatting](https://security.togoder.click/glossary/typosquatting): Typosquatting is publishing a malicious package (or registering a domain) under a name that is one slip of the keyboard away from a popular one, so that people who mistype the name install the attacker's code instead.

## Scanning and API

- [Scan a project](https://security.togoder.click/scan): upload package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lock, poetry.lock, uv.lock, requirements.txt, Cargo.lock, go.sum, Gemfile.lock or composer.lock; parsing and the price quote are free
- [API documentation](https://security.togoder.click/api-docs): `POST https://security.togoder.click/api/paid-scan` with a lockfile or `{"ecosystem":"npm","packageName":"express"}` returns HTTP 402 with a price; any x402 client (USDC on Base) pays and retries automatically, so AI agents can vet packages before installing them. Monthly API keys are available via https://security.togoder.click/account.

## Optional

- [Full text for LLMs](https://security.togoder.click/llms-full.txt)